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PUBLIC POLICY AND PREEMPTION: UNION 
EMPLOYEES' STATE WRONGFUL 
DISCHARGE ACTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The viability of a union employee's state cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge is dependent upon the outcome of two issues: (1) whether 
the cause of action is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (Section 301) which grants employees covered by 
collective bargaining agreements a federal cause of action for violations 
of those agreements; 1 and (2) whether the state's laws provide a union 
employee with the right to seek a remedy for wrongful discharge based 
on certain exceptions to the at-will doctrine. 2 
If a claim is preempted by Section 301, a federal or state court3 will 
interpret and enforce the agreement according to federal law, not state 
law.4 In such a case, a union employee's state claim for wrongful dis-
charge will either be dismissed as preempted, or treated as a Section 301 
breach of contract case. 5 Dismissal of the action is proper if the union 
employee pursued a Section 301 claim prior to exhausting all grievance 
and arbitration procedures within their collective bargaining agreement. 6 
Furthermore, a union employee's remedy in a Section 301 action is gen-
erally limited to reinstatement and back pay.7 
If the claim is not preempted by Section 301, however, it will be 
decided under state law. 8 The benefit of suing under state law is that an 
employee may be able to recover punitive and compensatory damages in 
a wrongful discharge suit. 9 
1. Section 301 provides: 
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined 
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought 
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, 
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 
citizenship of the parties. 29 u.s.c. § 185(a) (1982). 
2. See infra notes 65-70, 92, 103, 110-12 and accompanying text. 
3. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (federal and state 
courts have jurisdiction over Section 301 claims). 
4. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 
(1957); see also Local 174, Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 
103-05 (1962). 
5. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); see also Republic Steel 
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
6. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652. Failure to exhaust grievance and arbitration procedures 
may result in dismissal regardless of whether the Section 301 claim is pursued in 
federal or state court. 
7. See Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remediesfor Wrongful Discharge in the Af-
termath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 
S.D.L. REV. 63, 76 (1989) [hereinafter Yon over, Preemption of State Tort 
Remedies]. 
8. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., Hanna v. Emergency Medicine Ass'n, 77 Md. App. 595, 551 A.2d 492 
(1989); Lally v. Copygraphics, 413 A.2d 960 (N.J. Super. 1980), aff'd, 428 A.2d 
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Although the recent Supreme Court decision in Lingle v. Norge Divi-
sion of Magic Chef, Inc. \0 sheds light on the issue of federal preemption, 
there are wrongful discharge actions based on public policy and other 
exceptions to the at-will rule that the Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed. With respect to the issue of the viability of state causes of ac-
tion, in union employee wrongful discharge suits, there is a split of 
authority among the states as to whether a union employee may success-
fully maintain a wrongful discharge action in state court. 
This comment first discusses the development of Section 301 pre-
emption in wrongful discharge actions with reference to Supreme Court 
decisions in this area. Next, it analyzes the divergent state law ap-
proaches regarding a union employee's right to bring a wrongful dis-
charge claim in state court. Finally, this comment delineates which 
wrongful discharge actions based on at-will exceptions should properly 
be preempted by Section 301. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 301 PREEMPTION 
The doctrine of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution. I I Under the Supremacy Clause, Con-
gress has the power to preempt state laws that either conflict with federal 
law or thwart the intent of Congress in enacting the federal laws. 12 
Federal preemption became a significant issue in Section 301 actions 
with the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama. 13 In Lincoln Mills, the Court declared that Section 301 not 
only grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits involving violations of 
contracts between employers and unions, but also "authorizes federal 
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of ... collec-
tive bargaining agreements."14 As such, the Lincoln Mills Court empha-
sized that "[f]ederal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not 
state law."ls 
According to the Supreme Court, there are two congressional goals 
which impact the preemptive scope of Section 301: (1) enforcement of 
arbitration clauses to promote and achieve industrial peace; 16 and (2) de-
1317 (N.J. 1981); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172,384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); 
see also infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. 
10. 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (union employee's state retaliatory discharge claim based on 
state policy against discharge in retaliation for filing worker's compensation claim 
was not preempted by Section 301). 
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI § 32, cl. 2. 
12. See generally Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies, supra note 7, at 77; 
Bakaly & Kohn, Wrongful Discharge Actions, 41st N.Y.U. Conf. Lab. 9-1, 9-13 to -
14 (1988) [hereinafter Bakaly & Kohn]. 
13. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
14. /d. at 452. 
15. /d. at 457. 
16. See id. at 455 ("the agreement to arbitrate is the quid pro quo for an agreement not 
to strike"); see also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650,653,656 (1965) 
(contract grievance procedures are the preferred method for stabilizing plant com-
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velopment of a uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agree-
ments to ensure the peaceful negotiations and administration of those 
agreements. 17 These two congressional goals form the basis for the fed-
eral common law that has developed and are relevant factors in deter-
mining which claims are preempted by the operation of Section 301. 18 
Since its decision in Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court has held that 
union employees' claims involving interpretationsl9 and/or violations20 
of collective bargaining agreements are claims that arise under Section 
301. Consequently, these actions are preempted by Section 301 and gov-
erned by federal labor law, not state contract law.21 
The Supreme Court has also held that state claims based on tort 
theories are actions under Section 301 when the "evaluation of the tort 
claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the 
labor contract."22 A claim is deemed "inextricably intertwined" if the 
resolution of the claim is "substantially dependent upon analysis of the 
mon law); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 578, 581 (1960) (grievance machinery is the heart of industrial self 
government). 
17. See Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-05 
(1962). The Court recognized that the "existence of possibly conflicting legal con-
cepts might substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree to contract terms 
providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes." Id. at 104. The Court 
also noted that in "enacting Section 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal la-
bor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." Id. (emphasis supplied). 
18. See generally Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 
457 (1957). The Court acknowledged that the Labor Management Relations Act 
expressly provides some substantive law. Id. Where the Act is silent, however, the 
Court suggested that federal law be formulated from an examination of the policies 
behind the legislation. Id. The principle that parties must attempt to exhaust the 
grievance and arbitration procedures established in the collective bargaining agree-
ment when the claim falls within the scope of Section 301 is an example of federal 
substantive law. Id. at 451 (federal law under Section 301 requires that "the agree-
ment to arbitrate grievance disputes ... be specifically enforced"). Courts, however, 
cannot review the merits of an arbitration award in a Section 301 proceeding. 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); 
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Instead, the "judicial inquiry 
under [section] 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant 
party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator the 
power to make the award he made." Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582. If, however, 
the union has breached its duty of fair representation, the employee is not required 
to exhaust the procedures before instituting a Section 301 action. Hines v. Anchor 
Motor Freight Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
19. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 658-59 (1965); Local 174,Int'1 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. , 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962). 
20. See Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 104-05 (state breach of contract claim preempted by 
Section 301); Maddox, 379 U.S. at 657. 
21. See Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103 ("the dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion 
that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area cov-
ered by the statute") (emphasis supplied); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 ("the sub-
stantive law to apply in suits under Section 301 ... is federal law") (emphasis 
supplied). 
22. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,213 (1985). 
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terms of an agreement. "23 Only if a claim is based on state law which 
confers "nonnegotiable state-law rights ... independent of any right es-
tablished by contract" will the claim survive Section 301 preemption.24 
The "inextricably intertwined" test was first applied in Allis-Chal-
mers Corp. v. Lueck,25 where the Supreme Court held that a state tort 
action for bad-faith handling of an insurance claim was preempted by 
Section 301. In Allis-Chalmers, a union employee, who suffered a back 
injury, was not receiving disability benefits from his employer and its 
insurance company as required under the collective bargaining agree-
ment.26 Instead of utilizing the grievance procedures as mandated by the 
labor agreement, the employee initiated a state court action asserting that 
the insurance company and the employer breached their duty to act in 
good faith in handling his disability claim under state law.27 The lower 
courts granted and affirmed the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment on Section 301 preemption grounds,28 but the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin reversed.29 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that Section 
301 preempted the claim. Applying the Section 301 preemption test, the 
Court concluded that under Wisconsin law, the tort asserted "intrinsi-
cally relates to the nature and existence of the contract ... [and] the 
duties imposed and rights established through the state tort ... derive 
from the rights and obligations established by the contract."30 Because 
state law required an examination of the collective bargaining agreement 
to establish if a duty of good faith existed, resolution of the state claim 
was substantially dependent upon an analysis of the agreement.31 The 
Allis-Chalmers Court reasoned that: 
the whole range of disputes traditionally resolved through arbi-
tration could be brought in the first instance in state court by a 
complaint in tort rather than in contract. A rule that permitted 
an individual to sidestep available grievance procedures would 
cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, ... as well as 
eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-contract law under 
Section 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the 
23. Id. at 220. 
24.Id. 
25. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). 
26. Id. at 204-05. 
27. Id. at 206. 
28.Id. 
29. Id. at 206-08. The Court relied on standards for determining NLRA preemption as 
announced in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) and 
Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977). Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Leuck, 471 
U.S. 202,208 (1985). The Court, however, noted that preemption under the NLRA 
was not at issue. Id. at 211 n.6. NLRA preemption is beyond the scope of this 
comment. 
30. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 216-17. 
31. Id. at 217-21. 
574 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
responsibility to interpret the labor contract. 32 
According to the Court, the meaning of disability-benefit provisions, if 
left to state courts, would undermine the goal of a uniform federal inter-
pretation of collective bargaining agreements. 33 
The Allis-Chalmers "inextricably intertwined" test was subsequently 
applied in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler 34 
to a state tort claim which alleged that a union breached its duty of care 
to provide union employees with a safe workplace. The Court held that 
the claim was preempted by Section 301 because it was necessary to in-
terpret the labor agreement to ascertain whether the union had an im-
plied duty of care to provide a safe workplace, and if so, the nature and 
scope of that duty.35 
III. LINGLE V. NORGE DIVISION OF MAGIC CHEF, INC 
After the decision in Allis-Chalmers, federal courts split with respect 
to the preemptive effect of Section 301 on wrongful discharge claims, 
particularly discharges grounded in violation of state public policies. 36 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lingle v. Norge Division of 
Magic Chef, Inc.,37 to resolve this conflict. 
In Lingle, the employee was covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement which provided that employees could only be discharged for 
just cause. 38 The employee was discharged for allegedly filing a false 
workers' compensation claim. 39 While her arbitration proceeding was 
pending, she initiated an action in state court alleging that she had been 
32. [d. at 219-20. 
33. [d. at 220. 
34. 481 U.S. 851 (1987). But cf Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (em-
ployee's breach of individual employment contract claim was not preempted be-
cause employee did not rely on the collective bargaining agreement for relief and 
therefore claim resolution was not substantially dependent upon an analysis of the 
labor agreement). 
35. Hechler, 481 U.S. at 862. 
36. Compare Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(contractual employee's wrongful discharge claim based on public policy pre-
empted), rev'd, 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg., 762 F.2d 511, 
517 (7th Cir. 1987); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 1001 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795, 795-97 (8th Cir. 1986); Dur-
rette v. UGI Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Smith v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 664 F. Supp. 290, 290-93 (E.D. Tenn. 1987); Edwards v. Western Mfg., 
641 F. Supp. 616, 619 (D. Kan. 1986); Messenger v. Volkswagen of Am., 58 F. 
Supp. 565 (S.D. W.Va. 1984) with Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857 (9th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988) (wrongful discharge founded on state 
public policy not preempted by Section 301); Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Air-
craft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1987); Herring v. Prince Macaroni of N. J., 
Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1986); Orsini v. Echlin, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 38 (N.D. 
Ill. 1986). 
37. 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
38. [d. at 401. 
39. [d. 
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discharged for exercising her rights under the Illinois Workers' Compen-
sation Act.4O The employer removed the case to federal district court 
and filed a motion to either dismiss the case on preemption grounds or 
stay further proceedings pending the resolution of the arbitration.41 The 
district court held that the employee's retaliatory discharge claim fell 
within the scope of Section 301 because it was "inextricably intertwined 
with the collective bargaining provision prohibiting wrongful discharge 
or discharge without cause. "42 As a result, the claim was one under Sec-
tion 301 and the employee's failure to exhaust grievance and arbitration 
procedures, as required under federal labor law, warranted dismissa1.43 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district 
court.44 In the interim, the arbitrator found for the employee and 
awarded her reinstatement with full back pay.45 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed the decisions 
of the lower courtS.46 The Court held that because resolution of the em-
ployee's wrongful discharge claim under state law did not require a court 
to interpret any term of the collective bargaining agreement, Section 301 
did not preempt state law application.47 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court examined how the state court would resolve the wrongful dis-
charge claim.48 Under Illinois law, to substantiate retaliatory discharge, 
the employee was required to introduce facts from which it could be in-
ferred that she was discharged for exercising her rights under the Illinois 
Workers' Compensation Act and the employer's motive in discharging 
her was to deter her from exercising those rights.49 The employer could 
defend its actions by establishing a non-retaliatory reason for discharging 
the employee. 50 The Court reasoned that these factual issues only in-
volved the conduct of the parties and the motivation behind the em-
ployer's decision to discharge the employee. 51 Accordingly, neither the 
elements of the remedy nor the defenses to the claim required a court to 
interpret any term of the collective bargaining agreement. 52 Therefore, 
the Court rationalized that the state-law claim was "independent" of the 
collective bargaining agreement for preemption purposes. 53 
40. Id. at 402. 
41. Id. 
42. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. Ill. 1985), 
aff'd, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
43. Id. at 1450. 
44. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1987), 
rev'd, 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
45. Ling/e, 486 U.S; at 402. 
46. Id. at 413. 
47. Id. at 408-13. 





53. Id. at 410. This two-step analysis is evident from the Court's pronouncement that 
"as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement 
576 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
The Court explicitly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning 
that the claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the labor agreement 
in that the state court and the arbitrator arguably might be examining 
the same facts to decide the same issue. 54 According to the Court, such 
"parallelism" did not render the state law analysis dependent upon the 
contractual determination of whether the employee was discharged for 
just cause. 55 As the Court aptly observed: 
[S]ection 301 preemption merely ensures that federal law will 
be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, 
and says nothing about the substantive rights a State may pro-
vide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not de-
pend upon the interpretation of such agreements. . .. [E]ven if 
dispute resolution pursuant to [an] agreement, on the one hand, 
and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely 
the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be re-
solved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 
independent for Section 301 preemption purposes. 56 
Although the Court rejected Section 301 preemption of the retalia-
tory discharge claim after the employee successfully proceeded through 
arbitration, the Court explained that its decision did not undermine the 
need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration and the concern for uni-
form federal labor laws.57 Nevertheless, the Lingle decision does impact 
on the collective bargaining and arbitration processes. For instance, 
union employees who have an "independent" claim against their em-
ployer for wrongful discharge based on a violation of a state public policy 
itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for Section 301 [preemption] pur-
poses." Id. Accordingly, a court must first examine the state law to determine if it 
requires reference to a collective bargaining agreement to resolve the dispute. Only 
when a court is not required to interpret the labor agreement can the claim be con-
sidered "independent" of the agreement. If, however, a court is required to analyze 
the terms of a labor contract because the state law is "inextricably intertwined" with 
consideration of the terms of the labor contract, "the claim will be treated as a 
Section 301 claim ... or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law." 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 220 (1985). The test espoused in 
Allis-Chalmers remains applicable because the Lingle Court only created a modified, 
but similar, test for determining if an application of state law is preempted. Lingle 
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,411 (1988). The Lingle Court, in 
essence, clarified when a claim is "independent" under Allis-Chalmers. 
54. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-09. The identical issue, according to the Seventh Circuit, 
would be "whether there was 'just cause' to discharge the worker." Id. at 408 (cita-
tion omitted). 
55.Id. 
56. Id. at 409-10 (citations omitted). 
57. Id. at 410-11. "The result we reach today is consistent ... with the policy offoster-
ing a uniform, certain adjUdication of disputes over the meaning of collective bar-
gaining agreements. . .. [The] interpretation of collective bargaining agreements 
remains firmly in the arbitral realm." Id. The Court reiterated that if a state court 
is permitted to first interpret a provision in a labor contract before the arbitrator, 
arbitration, as a method of dispute resolution in the collective bargaining area, 
would lose most of its effectiveness. Id. 
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may be permitted to proceed in state court without invoking the arbitra-
tion procedures provided for in their collective bargaining agreement. 58 
Alternatively, a grievant could exhaust the contractual procedures, ob-
tain relief, and subsequently bring a wrongful discharge action in state 
court seeking additional damages. 59 The availability of such a variety of 
methods to resolve the dispute significantly diminishes the possibility 
that employees will invoke only arbitration.60 Not only does the availa-
bility of a state action make arbitration a less valuable choice of dispute 
resolution, but the mere existence of those alternative mechanisms frus-
trates the promotion of industrial peace.61 
An employer typically agrees to an arbitration clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement in order to obtain another clause in the agreement 
which is favorable to management. In fact, the Supreme Court has held 
that "the agreement to arbitrate is the quid pro quo for an agreement not 
to strike. "62 If employees value the state law remedy more than the arbi-
tration procedures, the employer may not be able to persuade the union 
58. See Bakaly & Kohn, supra note 12, at 9-29-30. If, however, a claim is not "in-
dependent" but arises under Section 301 (because it involves an interpretation or a 
violation of the agreement) a union employee will still be required to exhaust the 
grievance and arbitration procedures found in the labor agreement. See Republic 
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 376 U.S. 650 (1965). In such a case, the grievance and 
arbitration procedures would be the employee's exclusive remedy. 
59. Bakaly & Kohn, supra note 12, at 9-29 to -34. In their article, Bakaly and Kohn 
identify three alternative methods whereby a union employee could obtain a dual 
remedy. First, the discharged union employee could bring an "independent" 
wrongful discharge action without first utilizing the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure. Second, she could bring the action "after commencing the grievance and arbi-
tration procedure under the labor agreement by filing a lawsuit during a step of a 
multi-level grievance procedure." Id. at 9-30. Finally, the employee could bring the 
action after a favorable or unfavorable arbitration award. Id. A state, however, 
may preclude an employee from seeking a remedy in state court even if the claim is 
independent of the labor agreement. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
60. But see Preemption of State Tort Remedies, supra note 7, at 92-94. Professor Yon-
over posits that because the employee will have the burden of proof in an "in-
dependent" wrongful discharge action, an arbitrator could award punitive or 
compensatory damages, and because there are expensive litigation costs inherent in 
any state court proceeding, union employees "may resort, by choice, only to the 
grievance/arbitration process." Id. at 93. Professor Yonover, however, fails to take 
into consideration the employees' increased bargaining power in the collective bar-
gaining process if employees bring, or there is a threat that union employees may 
initiate, such "independent" causes of action in state court. See infra notes 62-63 
and accompanying text. This factor may weigh in favor of union employees' "in-
dependent" tort actions. 
61. Bakaly & Kohn, supra note 12, at 9-30. Bakaly and Kohn suggest that the "court's 
holding undoubtedly will have a significant impact on the future direction of labor-
management relations in connection with agreements to arbitrate." Id. They cor-
rectly identify that the "conflicting substantive outcomes ... could impede the par-
ties willingness to agree to a uniform system of private dispute resolution." Id. 
Conversely, the possibility that the arbitrator and the state court could find for the 
employee may have the same effect, even though the Supreme Court has focused 
primarily on the dangers of "conflicting legal concepts." See Local 174, Int'l Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962). 
62. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). 
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to agree to grievance and arbitration procedures in order to secure a no 
strike clause. Consequently, union strike activity may increase because 
there will be no provision in the agreement forbidding such action. To 
avoid this possible result, it may be beneficial for an employer to agree 
not only to grievance and arbitration procedures, but also to a liquidated 
damage clause providing for reasonable damages in the event of a suc-
cessful wrongful discharge action. 63 
Although the Lingle decision does not further the Supreme Court's 
proclaimed goal of industrial peace in the collective bargaining area, it 
does not undermine the attainment of uniform federal labor laws. If a 
wrongful discharge claim survives Section 301 preemption, a state court 
will not be interpreting any term in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.64 Accordingly, the development of a cohesive and uniform set of 
labor laws regarding the meaning of a clause in a collective bargaining 
agreement will r~st in the singular discretion of the arbitrator. 
IV. CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEE'S ABUSIVE DISCHARGE 
ACTIONS AFTER LINGLE 
A. Wrongful Discharge Claims Based on the Public Policy Exception 
A majority of states have recognized various public policy excep-
tions to the rule that employees can be discharged for any or no reason 
(the "at-will" doctrine).65 For example, as the Lingle Court noted, in 
Illinois it is verboten for an employer to discharge an employee solely for 
exercising her rights under the state's workers' compensation statute. 66 
Other discharges recognized by state courts and legislatures as violative 
63. Bakaly and Kohn, supra note 12 suggest that the parties to a labor agreement may 
want to amend their arbitration clauses to be assured that the arbitration mecha-
nisms will be the employees' exclusive remedy. The use of a liquidated damage 
clause, however, may serve as an incentive; the employer can be certain that liability 
will extend only so far and the employees will find it desirable to avoid the time and 
costs of litigation. See Belko v. AVX Corp., 204 Cal. App. 3d 894, 251 Cal. Rptr. 
557 (1988) (punitive damages available if parties previously agreed that the arbitra-
tor can award them). Therefore, if the parties agree to an arbitration clause, the 
employer will have an agreement not to strike, which will preserve industrial peace. 
Cf Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 448. Of course, this method should only be instituted 
if the state views the wrongful discharge action as a tort claim and allows union 
employees to bring the action. States that view wrongful discharge actions as 
sounding in contract do not grant punitive or compensatory damages. See, e.g., 
Lopus v. L & L Shop-Rite, Inc., 171 Mich. App. 486, 430 N.W.2d 757 (1988); 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (1988). Thus, an 
employee will resort to the grievance and arbitration procedures because she has 
nothing to gain by bringing an "independent" state court action. 
64. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
65. See generally Yonover Preemption of State Tort Remedies, supra note 7; Robbins & 
Norwood, State Wrongful Discharge Law: Are Unionized Employees Covered? 12 E. 
REL. L.J. 19,20 (1986) [hereinafter Robbins & Norwood, State Wrongful Discharge 
Law). 
66. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (citing Midgett v. 
Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 909 (1985». 
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of state public policies include discharging an employee (1) for taking 
leave to serve on a jury;67 (2) for opposing and exposing illegal activities 
of an employer;68 (3) for refusing to take a polygraph examination,69 and 
(4) for filing a workers' compensation claim.7° 
Based on the Lingle decision, Section 301 arguably would not pre-
empt wrongful discharge claims based upon violations of either state 
common law or statutory public policies.71 A state which recognizes a 
public policy exception has created a right which exists independently of 
the collective bargaining agreement under the test set forth in Lingle. In 
order to enforce either the statutory or common law public policy, a state 
court would not be required to refer to or interpret any of the terms in 
the labor agreement. Instead, a court would focus on whether the em-
ployer violated the independent right according to the statutory or com-
mon law principles. Since most of these public policy exceptions were 
developed originally to protect at-will employees who are not, by defini-
tion, covered by labor agreements with just cause clauses,72 the substan-
tive test, logically, does not require a court to interpret any type of 
agreement. The resolution of the claim depends on the outcome of fac-
tual inquiries.73 For example, application of the public policy exception 
in wrongful discharge actions generally requires the resolution of two 
issues: (1) whether the employee is discharged in retaliation for engaging 
in protected activities; and (2) whether the discharge violated some 
clearly mandated public policy.74 
Several recent federal and state court decisions have found that 
wrongful discharge claims based on a specific state public policy are not 
preempted, and thus, follow the precedent set in Lingle.75 For example, 
67. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & 
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978). 
68. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 
P.2d 1330 (1980) (employee discharged for refusing to participate in illegal price-
fixing scheme); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 III. 2d 124,421 N.E.2d 
876 (1981) (employee discharged for reporting criminal activity). 
69. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1969); Leib-
owitz v. H.A. Winston, 342 Pa. Super. 456, 493 A.2d 111 (1985). 
70. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). 
71. See Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies, supra note 7, at 94; see also infra 
notes 76-89 and accompanying text. 
72. See Robbins & Norwood, State Wrongful Discharge Law, supra note 66. 
73. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988). 
74. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies, supra note 7, at 73. 
75. See, e.g., Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1989) (contrac-
tual employee's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against 
racial discrimination not preempted); Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 
F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1989) (age discrimination claim in violation of California's pub-
lic policy against discriminatory discharges not preempted); Ackerman v. Western 
Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1988) (handicap discrimination claim not pre-
empted); Kraft, Inc. v. City of Peoria, 531 N.E.2d 1106 (1988) (racial discrimina-
tion claim not preempted). There are also several opinions which were decided 
prior to Lingle where wrongful discharge claims founded on public policies survived 
Section 301 preemption. See, e.g., Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857 (9th 
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in Miller v. AT&T Network Systems 76 the Ninth Circuit found that an 
employee's wrongful discharge action based on a violation of the Oregon 
statute forbidding discrimination respecting physical handicap was not 
preempted by Section 301. The court, relying on the Allis-Chalmers test, 
concluded that the discrimination claim was based on a nonnegotiable77 
state law right, independant of any right established by the contract.78 In 
order to prove a discriminatory discharge under Oregon tort law, an em-
ployee is required to show that she can adequately perform her functions 
without the risk of incapacitating herself.79 Under the Oregon statute,80 
in order to determine the employee's capacity to adequately perform her 
job, a court is not required to interpret the standards governing dis-
charges found within the labor agreement.81 Instead, the state courts 
"look to independent expert opinions of what skills a particular job re-
quires without regard to minimum standards set out by the employer."82 
Consequently, the court decided that the state statute set forth an in-
dependent standard that was not "inextricably intertwined" with the 
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. 83 In addition, the spe-
cific statutory right was nonnegotiable because the state had declared the 
practice of discrimination unlawful and granted the right to be free from 
discrimination in the workplace to all of its citizens. 84 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp.,85 held 
that two employees' handicap discrimination discharge claims under the 
Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act (MHCRA), were not pre-
empted by Section 301.86 In its analysis, the court recognized that the 
Lingle Court clarified the language in Allis-Chalmers by explaining that 
"independent" state law actions are those that do not require an interpre-
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988) (employee's claims for wrongful dis-
charge for failing to work under unsafe conditions in violation of states public policy 
expressed in health and safety laws not preempted); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food 
Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (wrongful discharge claim based on pub-
lic policy against discharges in retaliation for an employee's refusal to participate in 
unlawful conduct not preempted), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); Peabody Ga-
lion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981). 
76. 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988). 
77. Miller V. AT & T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A right is 
nonnegotiable if the state law does not permit it to be waived, alienated, or altered 
by private agreement."). 
78. Id. at 545-46. The court stated: "Independent rights are those state-law rights that 
can be enforced without any need to rely on the particular terms, explicit or implied, 
contained in the labor agreement." Id. at 546. 
79. Id. at 549 (citations omitted). 
80. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.121,659.405,659.425 (1987). 
81. Miller, 850 F.2d at 549. 
82.Id. 
83. Id. at 549-50. According to the Ninth Circuit, its decision was consistent with the 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Lingle. Id. at 551 n.6. 
84. Id. at 550. 
85. 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 539 (1989). 
86. Id. at 1328. Two employees brought claims against the Chrysler Corporation alleg-
ing various tort theories. Id. at 1328-29. 
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tation of a collective bargaining agreement for their resolution. 87 Conse-
quently, the court found that an employee's claim under the MHCRA 
would involve the same factual inquiries that were discussed in Lingle.88 
In Smolarek, the employer asserted that because the agreement con-
tained a provision regarding reinstatement, the claim was a breach of 
contract case within the parameters of Section 301.89 The court, how-
ever, disagreed with the employer's position and noted that even though 
the employee could have decided to bring a claim alleging a violation of 
the agreement under Section 301, the fact that he decided to initiate an 
independent state tort action did not render the claim preempted.90 
B. Application of the Lingle Decision 
Although the Lingle decision extends to other wrongful discharge ac-
tions based on specific state public policies as the lower courts have al-
ready decided, it should not be interpreted to apply to abusive discharge 
claims based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the 
implied contract exceptions to the at-will rule. The Lingle case deals 
specifically with an employer's violation of a state public policy expressed 
in a statute. In addition, states that have adopted the public policy ex-
ception have invoked a test similar to the one used by Illinois courts, 
which the Lingle Court recognized focuses on factual determinations. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the implied con-
tract exceptions to the at-will rule, however, would require a court to 
construe the terms in the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, 
these wrongful discharge claims are not "independent" for Section 301 
preemption purposes. 
1. Wrongful Discharge Claims Based on the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory of 
wrongful discharge, unlike the public policy exception, has been adopted 
by only a few courtS.91 These courts have found the covenant to be im-
plied in every employment contract.92 The implied covenant "imposes 
on the stronger party 'a heightened duty not to act unreasonably in 
breaching the contract, and to consider the interest of the other party as 
tantamount to its own.' "93 An at-will employee states a cause of action 
in tort for a breach of this covenant if the employer has discharged the 
87. Id. at 1330. 
88. Compare id. at 1331-34 with Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 
(1988). 
89. Smolarek, 879 F.2d at 1332. 
90.Id. 
91. Yonover, Preemption 0/ State Tort Remedies, supra note 7, at 70. 
92. Robbins & Norwood, See State Wrongful Discharge Law, supra note 65, at 23. 
93. Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption 0/ State Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 1,4-5 (1986) [hereinafter Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption). 
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employee in bad faith. 94 Most courts, however, require an employee to 
prove that she satisfactorily performed her obligations for a long period 
of time and that the employer had a policy of dealing with its employees 
fairly and in good faith.95 
Both before and after the Lingle decision, union employees' claims 
which alleged a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing were found to be preempted by Section 301.96 For example, in 
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Association,97 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
the employee's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing required the interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement because under state law, the tort was designed to protect non-
unionized employees who lack job security. Since there was a contrac-
tual provision giving union employees greater protection than the im-
plied covenant, the court found no need to imply the good faith and fair 
dealing covenant. 98 
The Newberry opinion is indicative of how federal courts will nar-
rowly interpret the Lingle decision. The state tort action for breach of an 
implied covenant of good' faith, unlike the public policy theory of wrong-
ful discharge, was "inextricably intertwined" with the agreement because 
the covenant was implied from a collective bargaining agreement.99 Con-
sequently, the tort action was preempted by Section 301 because the 
court would have to examine the contract's language to determine 
whether the 'employer, by implication, agreed to provide job security. 100 
94. See Hames, The Current Status of the Doctrine of Employment-at- Will, 39 LAB. L.J. 
19, 27 (1988) [hereinafter Hames, Employment-at- Willj. 
95. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 
(1980). 
96. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text; see also, Young v. Anthony's Fish 
Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987); Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 
F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1985). 
97. 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988). 
98. Id. at 1147; see also Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th 
Cir. 1989). The Newberry court noted that the scope of Section 301 preemption "is 
not based on how the complaint is framed, but whether the claims can by resolved 
only by referring to the terms of the bargaining agreement." Newberry v. Pacific 
Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, the court consid-
ered the structure of the employee's complaint in determining that her claim re-
quired a court to interpret the agreement. Id. at 1147. Moreover, the court 
considered it relevant that the employee sought her remedy under the collective 
bargaining agreement. Id. Other courts, however, have recognized that employees 
can maintain one claim under the labor agreement and another claim independent 
of it. The fact that an employee chooses to utilize both remedies does not render her 
independent claim preempted by virtue of the fact that the evidence also alleges a 
Section 301 breach of contract claim. See Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 
1326, 1332 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 539 (1989); Kraft, Inc. v. City of 
Peoria, 177 III. App. 3d 197, 531 N.E.2d 1106, 1109-11 (1988). 
99. See Bakaly & Kohn, supra note 12, at 9-33. Bakaly and Kohn suggest that this state 
law action should be preempted by Section 301 because the implied covenant is 
derived from the parties' employment relationship or contract, which in a union 
setting, is the parties' collective bargaining agreement. /d. 
100. Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption, supra note 93, at 27-28. "The duty arises 
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2. Wrongful Discharge Claims Based on the Implied Contract 
Exception 
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The implied contract exception to the at-will doctrine provides that 
an employer's promise (express or implied) of job security contained in 
its policies or handbooks may constitute a binding contractual obliga-
tion. 101 The union employee, in action for- breach of an implied contract, 
is relying on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement by 
alleging that the rights under the implied contract are more favorable to 
her than the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 102 As such, 
these claims are preempted by Section 301.103 
In Sewell v. Genstar Gypsum Products CO.,I04 a federal district court 
case decided after the Lingle decision, the court held that an employee's 
claim of breach of an implied contract of job security was not based on a 
nonnegotiable state law right independent of the rights under the labor 
agreement. 105 Rather, the resolution of the claim was "inextricably in-
tertwined" with consideration of the terms of the bargaining agreement 
because it was structured upon reference to, and an interpretation of, the 
bargaining agreement. 106 The labor agreement specifically defined the 
employer's ability to discharge employees for "just cause." Thus, the 
claim that there was an implied right stemming from the labor agreement 
could not survive Section 301 preemption. 107 
as a matter of law from the employment relationship created by the contract .... 
'[W]hat that duty embraces is dependent upon the nature of the bargain struck be-
tween [the parties] and the legitimate expectations of the parties which arise from 
the contract.''' Id. 
101. Touissant v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 
(1980); see also Hames, Employment-at-Will, supra note 94, at 24-25. 
102. Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption, supra note 93, at 24. ("An action for 
breach of implied contract is, in essence, a claim that the employee enjoys rights 
under an individual contract and that the individual contract rights are more benefi-
cial to the employee than the terms of the collective bargaining agreement."); see 
also Bakaly & Kohn, supra note 12, at 9-32-33 (discussing why a claim under this 
exception should be preempted). 
103. See supra notes 97-99; see also Olguin v. Inspiration Conso!. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 
1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984) (because "the agreement provides the same or greater 
protection of job security that state tort law seeks to provide for non unionized em-
ployees" and policy manuals and other independent agreements are effective as part 
of a labor agreement, claims alleging an implied right not to be dismissed withom 
cause are preempted); Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (employee could not invoke the implied contract theory under state law 
because the employee's collective bargaining agreement provided him with a rem-
edy, and thus his action was a section 301 breach of contract case). 
104. 699 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Nev. 1988). 
105.Id. 
106. Id. at 1447, 1449. 
107. Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption, supra note 93, at 24; Bakaly & Kohn, supra 
note 12, at 9-32. "This claim is tantamount to a claim that employment has been 
terminated without 'cause.'" Id. 
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If a court finds that an employee's claim is not preempted by Section 
301, it must then determine whether the state's laws protect union em-
ployees from wrongful discharges against public policy. Of course, a 
court could initially dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, with-
out reaching the preemption issue, if the state in fact did not recognize 
the right of union employees' to bring wrongful discharge actions. I08 
Therefore, a union employee's claim for wrongful discharge will not 
reach a jury unless the claim not only survives preemption but the state 
court also recognizes a union employee's right to bring such a claim. 
Although most states have adopted the public policy exception to 
the at-will rule,109 some states only recognize this wrongful discharge 
theory for non-unionized or at-will employees. 110 There is a trend within 
the states, however, to grant the same opportunity to receive punitive 
and compensatory damages in wrongful discharge actions to union em-
ployees. 111 Nevertheless, some states that permit union employees to 
bring these actions either require employees to exhaust the grievance and 
arbitration procedures found within the bargaining agreement before ini-
tiating the state tort action 112 or treat an arbitrator's finding of "just 
cause" as precluding a subsequent state action under rules of issue 
preclusion. I 13 
Although the Lingle court left the decision of whether to grant the 
108. See Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1989). 
109. See Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies, supra note 7, at 70; Hames, Em-
ployment at Will, supra note 94, at 20. 
110. See, e.g., Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox, 349 Pa. Super. 351, 503 A.2d 36 (Pa. 1986); 
see also Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1989); Dragone 
v. M.J. Raynes, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (because New York does 
not recognize the tort of wrongful discharge based on the public policy exception, 
such an action brought by a union employee would involve an analysis of the terms 
of the agreement). 
111. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (1988), cert. granted, 778 
P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1989); Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 
645 (1988); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988); Lepore v. 
National Tool & Mfg. Co., 224 N.J. 463, 540 A.2d 1296 (1988), aff'd, 115 N.J. 226, 
557 A.2d 1371, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 366 (1989); Bonner v. Fleming Cos. , 734 
S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App. 1987); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 III. 2d 143,473 
N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985); see also Griess v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp. of Del., 882 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1989). 
112. See, e.g., Childers v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 881 F.2d 1259, 1265 (4th Cir. 
1989) (applying Maryland law); Schuyler v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 374 
N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
113. See supra note 111; see also Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 
(1988). Other state courts that have extended the public policy exception theory of 
wrongful discharge to union employees do not require a union employee to exhaust 
the procedures. See, e.g., Beckman v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 121 III. 2d 
570,527 N.E.2d 303 (1988); Conaway v. Webster City Prods Co., 431 N.W.2d 795 
(Iowa 1988); Ryherd v. General Cable Co., 124 III. 2d 418,530 N.E.2d 431, 438 
(1988); Bonner v. Fleming Co., 734 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App. 1987); Vaughn v. Pacific 
Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980). 
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right of union employees to bring wrongful discharge actions with state 
courts, state courts have erroneously relied on the ruling in Lingle to 
resolve this issue. 114 In Lingle, the particular state already recognized 
this wrongful discharge theory for union employees. I IS The Court only 
held that such actions are not preempted, and therefore, did not rule on 
what state law should provide. 116 Accordingly, states do not have to 
amend their wrongful discharge laws to reconcile the Lingle decision. 
Given this situation, state courts should not rely on issue preclusion 
or exhaustion of remedies to either preempt an employee's wrongful dis-
charge claim or preclude the action according to state law despite the 
negative effect Lingle has on the arbitration process. When an action is 
not preempted by the operation of Section 301, federal law does not ap-
ply. Hence, the federal law which provides that employees must exhaust 
the grievance and arbitration procedures is not applicable under these 
circumstances. 1l7 With respect to issue preclusion of an arbitrator's find-
ing of just cause, one court has stated the following: 
The only factual difference between this case and Lingle is that 
the employee in Lingle, unlike the employee here, won her 
grievance. Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion, however, 
indicates a prior resort to arbitration, whether or not success-
ful, has any bearing on the preemption of a claim .... 118 
Furthermore, an arbitrator is neither considering the public policy of the 
state, nor is she considering the motive of the employer in resolving the 
labor dispute. 119 
One rationale for allowing contractual employees to bring wrongful 
discharge actions based on the public policy exception is that the public 
policies developed by the courts and legislatures are provided to all em-
ployees. 12o Another rationale is that courts realized that union employ-
ees only recovered damages under the contract which were generally 
114. See Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1373 (1988), cert. granted, 778 
P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1989). 
115. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988). 
116.Id. 
117. A court might interpret Lingle narrowly and determine that because the union em-
ployee in Lingle went through arbitration, a claim avoids preemption only when this 
occurs. However, the federal law prior to Lingle specifically states that exhaustion 
is required only when federal law applies. See supra note 18. 
118. Ryherd v. General Cable Co., 124 III. 2d 418, 530 N.E.2d 438 (1988). 
119. See Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645, 651 (1988). 
120. Ewing v. Koppers, 312 Md. 45, 49, 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1988). The Ewing court 
reasoned that the "availability of this cause of action to all employees, at will and 
contractual, will foster the state's interest in deterring particularly reprehensible 
conduct ... [and that] it would be illogical to deny the contract employee access to 
the courts equal to that afforded the at-will employee." /d.; See also Lepore v. Na-
tional Tool & Mfg. Co., 224 N.J. Super. 463, 540 A.2d 1296, 1300 (1988) (statutory 
public policy rights do not derive from the bargaining process and are rights appli-
cable to all employees). 
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limited to reinstatement and back pay.l21 At-will employees, however, 
can recover punitive and compensatory damages in state wrongful dis-
charge actions.122 The courts expressed discomfort with this unequal 
treatment, and as a result, expanded public policy protections to union 
employees. 123 In addition, punitive damages deter employers from vio-
lating a state's public policy.124 To enforce these worker's rights, the 
courts deemed it necessary to apply the tort theory to union 
employees. 125 
Third, according to some courts, "[a]rbitral procedures, while well 
suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, are comparatively inap-
propriate for the resolution of tort claims."126 Finally, one state court 
reasoned that: 
[A] number of employees who may have voted not to enter into 
the agreement are forced to accede to the will of the majority. 
The employee subject to a collective bargaining agreement 
whose individual right has been violated, is forced to submit his 
grievance under an agreement which was never designed to 
protect individual workers, but to balance the individual 
against the collective interest. 127 
Conversely, a reason given by courts for not granting contractual 
employees a right to initiate wrongful discharge actions is that the public 
policy exception to the at-will rule was formulated to provide protection 
for those employees who were not covered by labor agreements. 128 Thus, 
an employee who is not at-will should not be permitted to rely on a the-
ory of wrongful discharge which is an exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine. 129 Furthermore, these courts justify their approach on 
contract principles. 130 The union and the employer agree to the remedies 
and provide that the grievance and arbitration proceedings are the em-
ployees' exclusive remedy, and the decision rendered by the arbitrator is 
121. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143,473 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (1984). 
122. Id. at 149-50, 473 N.E.2d at 1283. 
123. Id. ("in order to provide a complete remedy it is necessary that the victim of a 
retaliatory discharge claim be given an action in tort .... "); Lepore, 224 N.J. Super. 
at 473,540 A.2d at 1301 ("we do not think ... employees should be denied the same 
remedy simply because they are members of a union."). 
124. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. 
125. Id. 
126. Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804,752 P.2d 645,651 (1988); Lepore, 
224 N.J. Super at 472, 540 A.2d at 1300 (an arbitrator normally cannot consider 
public interest and does not determine violations of law or public policy); see also 
Lathrop v. Entenmanns, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1373 (1988), cert. granted, 778 P.2d 
1370 (Colo. 1989) (public policy considerations may not be presented in a claim 
based upon a labor agreements definition of "just cause"). 
127. Coleman, 752 P.2d at 651. 
128. Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox, 349 Pa. Super. 351,354, 503 A.2d 36, 37 (1986). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 355, 503 A.2d at 38; see also Embry v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 62 
Or. App. 113, 659 P.2d 436 (1983). 
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final and binding. 13l These courts reason that they should give effect to 
the intent of the parties to the contract. 
Courts which do not extend wrongful discharge actions based on 
public policy to union employees have not been persuaded by the argu-
ments advanced by the proponents for the extension of the tort to union 
employees. For example, one court acknowledged that "while the at-will 
employee may be entitled to punitive damages in a civil action, he does 
not have the ability to obtain some of the remedies available to union 
members; such as reinstatement .... "132 
The arguments in support of extending this theory of wrongful dis-
charge to union employees are persuasive. A state public policy is one 
that should protect union employees, not just at-will employees. A state 
should apply its laws uniformally in order to enforce its statutory or 
common law public policies and to prevent employers from violating 
these recognized principles. Moreover, most state courts have recog-
nized that wrongful discharge is a tort, not an action arising out of con-
tract.133 Hence, the action is separate and distinct, and different issues 
must be resolved which arise outside of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The theories behind the Lingle decision logically should lead a 
state court to allow these actions, but state courts, however, should care-
fully scrutinize the Lingle decision before determining these issues of 
state law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As a result of the Lingle decision, union employees who bring 
wrongful discharge actions based on the public policy exception to the at-
will rule may recover punitive and compensatory damages in state court 
actions. 134 Moreover, if the employee first utilizes the grievance and ar-
bitration procedures, and is successful, the employee generally is rein-
stated with back pay. The ability of union employees to obtain a "dual 
remedy," therefore, is clear. 
Although Lingle holds that Section 301 does not preempt a contrac-
tual employee's retaliatory discharge claim, the decision should not be 
interpreted to extend to wrongful discharge claims based on the implied 
contract or implied duty of good faith and fair dealing exceptions to the 
131. Phillips, 349 Pa. Super. at 355, 503 A.2d at 38. 
132. [d. at 354-55, 503 A.2d at 38. 
133. See Bakaly & Kohn, supra note 12, at 9-8. 
134. Butel Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,413 n.12 (1988). As 
the Lingle Court observed: 
A collective bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information 
such as rate of pay and other economic benefits that might be helpful in 
determining the damages to which a worker prevailing in a state law suit is 
entitled. . .. Although federal law would govern the interpretation of the 
agreement to determine the proper damages, the underlying state law 
claim, not otherwise preempted, would stand. 
[d. at 413. 
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at-will rule. Lingle should apply only to wrongful discharge claims based 
on common law or statutory public policies. 
Finally, state courts could refuse to permit union employees to initi-
ate wrongful discharge actions in state court, despite the fact that such 
claims are not preempted by Section 301. Whether a state will extend 
this right to contractual employees is a matter of state law. The Lingle 
decision does not affect the outcome of this issue. Nevertheless, the argu-
ments in favor of extending the right to union employees are persuasive. 
Marlene Lange Budd 
